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Abstract: The approbation, in the last few decades, of ‘African ways
of knowing’ and, more recently, the critical emphasis on ‘knowledge
in the blood’—which refers to ‘deeply entrenched’ and ‘received
knowledge’, notably of (white) Afrikaners—give rise to all kinds of
questions and concerns. What makes certain ways of knowing and
kinds of knowledge ‘African’ and ‘Afrikaner’, respectively? What do
these ideas cover and include, and what falls outside their respective
ambits? What functions are served by appealing to these notions?
Amongst other things, the idea of ‘African ways of knowing’ consti-
tutes part of a challenge to occidental belief systems, science, educa-
tion and ethics. Theorists who single out certain ways of knowing as
distinctly and uniquely ‘African’ or characteristically ‘Afrikaner’,
respectively, not only emphasise their significance in post-colonialist
and antiracist discourse but also maintain that the study of these is of
profound relevance to educational and socio-political transformation.
In this paper, I examine the notions in question, by seeking to under-
stand how those who employ them might see them as plausible,
before referring them to a particular epistemological framework.
Problems that need to be addressed include relativism about knowl-
edge and truth, as well as elevation of all kinds of beliefs—notably
superstitions and racial prejudices—to the status of knowledge, for
any real and sustainable transformation to occur.
Keywords: African ways of knowing; belief; justification; 
‘knowledge in the blood’; prejudice; relativism; superstition; truth.
‘Imfihlakalo yasemhlabezi iqiniso’. (‘The truth is the world’s secret’. –
Zulu proverb)
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Introduction 
In 1996, Credo Mutwa1 published Isilwane/The Animal, essentially
an account of ‘the reverence in which animals are held according to
African ritual and tradition’ (Mutwa 1996: back cover blurb). Among
the many fascinating ‘traditional tales’ contained in the book is
Mutwa’s account of why the cat is ‘more than just a pet’ (Mutwa
1996: 30): ‘treating a cat properly guarantees that it will protect you
against the tokoloshe and the mantindane’ (Mutwa 1996: 31). He
goes on to provide the following account, which is worth quoting in
virtual entirety:
From the Cape right up to Zaire, there is a fearful creature known as the
tokoloshe. It is short, thickset, round-headed and furry, with a round snout
and a pair of glowing, bright red eyes. It has pointed ears and a thick, bony
ridge extending from above its forehead to the nape of its neck. This crea-
ture, short though it is, is extremely aggressive and viciously cruel. It spe-
cialises in sexually assaulting women and challenges benighted travellers
to stick fights which it triumphantly wins (Ibid.).
Mutwa writes that in the course of his career as a traditional healer, he
has ‘come across many women who have been sexually molested and
even raped by this terrible creature, which moves in the shadowy field
where the real and the unreal, the visible and the invisible meet’
(Ibid.). ‘As a sanusi’, Mutwa has 
treated many men who have been beaten and frightened out of their wits
by the tokoloshe. However, there are some people, especially white scep-
tics, who believe that the tokoloshe is nothing more than a figment of
African superstition and fertile imagination (Mutwa 1996: 32).
Referring to the fact that he possesses ‘over fifty years of experi-
ence’, Mutwa feels impelled to
appeal to these sceptics to think again. The tokoloshe is real – it does exist.
I have seen the way it injures men and women who are unfortunate
enough to fall into its clutches. When Africans fear the tokoloshe they are
not fearing a figment of their imaginations. Instead of being laughed off
by sceptics, the tokoloshe deserves investigation (Ibid.).
‘There is another creature’, he reports,
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which is not unlike the tokoloshe in its love of inflicting bodily harm, and
which is also greatly feared. … Like the tokoloshe, the mantindane stands
about three-and-a-half feet tall. Unlike the tokoloshe, which is a power-
fully built, almost chimpanzee-like creature, it appears extremely frail. It
has a large, bald, egg-shaped head which can be as large as a fully grown
watermelon, and it has very weak-looking jaws. Its mouth is little more
than a slit and the nose is rudimentary, with nostrils like comma-shaped
holes. The creature’s eyes are very strange and resemble beans. They are
slanted and covered with what looks like thick, jet-black plastic or horn.
It has a very thin neck, narrow shoulders and long, thin arms, and its
hands, although resembling those of a human being, are very thin and
long. Its long, thin and bony fingers have more joints than those of a
human being. The creature’s two spindly legs end in long, delicate feet.
The mantindane is civilised and highly intelligent, and unlike the
tokoloshe, which appears stark-naked, it always wears some type of gar-
ment that reaches from its neck and covers its limbs completely. The
colour of this creature’s skin is a strange greyish white with slight pink
overtones. Like the tokoloshe, the mantindane treats human beings who
fall into its hands cruelly and with utter contempt. It kidnaps males and
females and scoops out flesh from their legs, thighs and even buttocks
and upper arms. Unlike the tokoloshe which is solitary, mantindane oper-
ate in groups. There can be as many as twenty of these vicious creatures
in one group.
Sometimes a gang of mantindane will kidnap a person and ill-treat him
or her. They will then release the person, only to kidnap them again a few
months or even a few years later (Ibid.).
Mutwa states that he has ‘met many black men and women
throughout Africa who have been kidnapped by these creatures sev-
eral times, and who bear scars on their bodies that testify to their ter-
rible ordeals at the hands of these strange and fearful beings’ (Ibid.).
‘I have personally fallen victim to mantindane’, he reports, ‘— not
once, but three times—and I still carry scars on my body that testify
to the truth of what I say’ (Ibid.)
Mutwa’s account is noteworthy, in the present context, for its
implicit acknowledgement of the conditions that are generally
assumed to have to be in place when we make knowledge claims:
belief, truth and appropriate justification (‘experience’, evidence, tes-
timony; also see Ryle 1963: 129-130, 146, 154-155). Clearly, ‘many
black men and women throughout Africa’ believe that the tokoloshe
and mantindane are real, that they exist. Equally clearly, beliefs in
these creatures might be put to educational use in terms of compara-
tive studies of cultural creativity and myth-making (see Lillejord &
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Mkabela 2004). Do these beliefs constitute ‘African ways of know-
ing’, however, and can (and should) they be taught as ‘African knowl-
edge’? Before one can even begin to answer these questions, one
ought to be clear about what is involved in judging others’ knowledge
claims, especially if these ‘others’ adhere to what would appear to be
substantially different epistemological traditions. Am I inflicting
‘epistemic harm’ on someone when I judge her beliefs to be untrue
and/or lacking in adequate justification? When I refer to the tokoloshe
or mantindane as ‘a figment of African superstition and fertile imag-
ination’, does this constitute ‘epistemic injustice’ towards those who
hold the beliefs in question? Evidently, the most desirable way of pro-
ceeding would be by trying to understand how those who have certain
beliefs could see them as plausible, to grasp the concepts they use. An
obvious starting-point appears to be the consideration of ‘African
ways of knowing’, and of the component concepts and examples,
especially as expounded by certain representative theorists. 
The idea of ‘African ways of knowing’
With post-colonialist and antiracist discourse characterising, if not
most then certainly the latter half of, the 20th century, there has been
a ‘back-to-the-roots’ celebration of ‘the African’, in Africa as else-
where. In postcolonial southern Africa especially, it has been coupled
with invocation of a particular idea. The ‘African Renaissance’ is
understood, among other things, as a process of reclamation of indige-
nous or traditional African ‘ways’—of knowing, seeing, doing and
valuing —, a process of promotion of ‘African culture’. According to
Molefi K. Asante, 
the critique of Western and Westernised epistemologies constitutes an
important part of African epistemology. Moreover, in the postcolonial era
world, where the limitations of the dominant Western concepts have
become obvious, it is imperative … to decolonise knowledge, by explor-
ing different ways of knowing (Asante 2005: 40).
Asante goes on to explain that ‘African epistemology comprises
four basic African ways of knowing that can be separated into three
categories, the supernatural, the natural, and the paranormal paths to
knowledge’. The supernatural mode ‘includes divination … and rev-
elation (i.e., messages revealed in dreams and visions)’ (Ibid.). These
two ‘cognitive modes’ involve ‘the intervention of supernatural
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beings—spirits, ancestors, dead relatives, gods, goddesses—who
impart knowledge’ to living humans ‘directly through a dream or
vision’, or ‘indirectly through mediums, diviners, animals, extraordi-
nary life events, or natural phenomena that require a special kind of
information’ (Ibid.). In the natural way of knowing, writes Asante,
‘human beings gain knowledge by using their natural faculties and
abilities, including intuition …, which consists of the work of the
human heart (i.e., feeling and insight), and reason, which consists of
a natural investigation of reality through the human intellect and log-
ical thought process’ (Ibid.). The third category, the paranormal mode,
comprises ‘extrasensory perception (ESP), which includes such
modes as clairvoyance and telepathy’ (Asante 2005: 41). Following
George J. Sefa Dei’s argument for the place of spirituality in educa-
tion and schooling (Dei 2002: 1, 2, 10; Dei 2004), Constantine Ngara
illustrates the need for a spirituality-centered thought and wisdom as
a definite paradigm of knowing in Africa. Examples of ‘ways of
knowing’ applicable to modern life in Africa are taboo-based know-
ing, ‘herbal knowledge’ or indigenous healing wisdom, faith-based
knowing, and political wisdom (coupled with prophetic wisdom)
(Ngara 2007: 14-16). Nashon, Anderson and Wright refer to these
ways of knowing as ‘knowing through taboos, through collective wis-
dom and experience, knowing through faith, and knowing through
communication (spiritual wisdom)’, respectively (Nashon et al 2007:
1, 2). ‘African spiritual ways of knowing’, writes Dei, 
are intimately bound up with the affirmation of self and indigenous sub-
jectivity. Many African ways of knowing affirm that personal subjectiv-
ity and emotionality must be legitimised, [t]hereby asserting that the
subjectivity/objectivity and rationality/irrationality splits are false. In
fact, while spiritual knowledge challenges subject-object dualism, it
simultaneously upholds “objectivity” to the subjective experience and
similarly some “subjectivity” to the objective reality. The subjective is
capable of comprehending the “objective universe” (Dei 2004: 340; see
also Dei 2002: 4).
To sum up, then, these appear to be the most significant character-
istics of ‘African ways of knowing’: epistemic and conceptual
decolonisation; self-affirmation; inclusion or reintroduction of spiri-
tuality and faith in education and schooling; emphasis on intuition in
knowledge production; and emphasis on relationality—not only
between human beings, and between human beings and ancestors,
spirits, gods and goddesses, but also between subject and object, the
African and Afrikaner ‘ways of knowing’ 31
02-Kai:Layout 1  3/30/10  11:58 AM  Page 31
rational and the irrational etc. The first of these, epistemic and con-
ceptual decolonisation, arguably entails all the other characteristics,
while the last three appear to constitute different senses of ‘holism’ in
epistemic activity.  
Definitions of ‘African ways of knowing’ characteristically focus
on ‘African’ or ‘indigenous’ (see, for example, Mudimbe 1988,
Bakari 1997, Owuor 2007 and Dei 2004)2—as if these were the diffi-
cult or controversial terms. They are commonly coupled with ‘tradi-
tional’, ‘local’, and the like, and contrasted with ‘universal’, ‘global’,
‘world’, ‘cosmopolitan’, ‘Western’, ‘Eurocentric’ etc. To date, no per-
tinent policy document, statement or article has yielded the under-
standing of ‘knowing’ or ‘knowledge’ the respective authors are
working with—as if these concepts were simple and uncontroversial.
I contend that they are not, and that a careful account of ‘knowing’
and ‘knowledge’ will reveal ‘African ways of knowing’ to be some-
thing of a misnomer. 
‘Ways of knowing’
Claudia Ruitenberg (2008) has recently provided some reasons for
concern about the plausibility of the notion of ‘ways of knowing’.
Drawing on the work of R.S. Peters (1970) and analytic philosophers
Gilbert Ryle (1963) and Richard Robinson (1971), she argues that the
phrase is not only vague but also fraught with all kinds of linguistic
and conceptual difficulties. She questions the continuing use of this
‘ambiguous’ and ‘vague’ phrase, for example by feminist and African-
ist scholars, especially when ‘more precise descriptions are available,
such as “sources of knowledge”, “forms of representation”, “ways of
learning”, and “regimes of truth”’ (Ruitenberg 2008: 306, 307).
Why is reference to ‘ways of knowing’ problematic? In essence,
‘know’ and ‘knowledge’ signal states, rather than activities. Knowl-
edge, according to Robinson, 
is never an act, or any kind of event. … Although [it] is not an event, it has
events closely connected with itself, notably its origin, that is the coming
to know or learning, and its ending, that is the being forgotten or other-
wise ceasing, and its recalls or realisations whenever we bring to mind or
remember what we know. … there is no actual as opposed to habitual pre-
sent tense of the verb “to know” in English (Robinson 1971: 17).
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In a related move, Peters employs Ryle’s distinction between
‘achievement words’ and ‘task words’ (Ryle 1963: 143-147, 155). The
latter refer to activities, while the former designate the results of these
activities. Thus, ‘teaching’ and ‘learning’ are task words, while edu-
cation is the (possible) result of these, i.e., an achievement word
(Peters 1970: 26). Similarly, knowledge is not a task word. It may be
the result of both teaching and learning, just as it may result from
‘reading’, ‘listening’, ‘seeking’, etc. But, even if these difficulties are
acknowledged, does the linguistic and conceptual awkwardness of a
phrase (in the English language) suffice to threaten the validity of the
idea it expresses? 
Ruitenberg is careful not to leap to this conclusion. Instead, she
examines the idea of ‘ways of knowing’ and asks what it is meant to
convey and to do, i.e., what claims or demands it is used to ‘make
(and mask)’ and what effects it is meant to bring about (Ruitenberg
2008: 309). It appears, she says, that claims about ‘ways of knowing’
often mask claims about and in favour of particular worldviews and
‘issues far beyond epistemology’ (Ibid., 309, 310). Indeed, a confla-
tion of ontology and epistemology is manifest in Asante’s assertion,
‘African ontology involves the interconnectedness of all reality, thus
African epistemology is grounded in holistic reason’ (Asante 2005:
42). Similarly, although less explicitly than Asante, Dei speaks of ‘the
struggle to affirm diverse forms of knowledge as a way to transform
education at the school site into learning experiences that are inter-
connected with the individual and collective reality or realities of the
learner in a locality’ (Dei 2004: 338).3 Ruitenberg argues, correctly I
believe, that the phrase ‘ways of knowing’ covers4 various ideas, like
‘spiritual beliefs, beliefs about the individuality or relationality of
human beings, and beliefs about the relation between reason and
emotion … under a single verb with a long history in Western episte-
mology’ (Ruitenberg 2008: 311). ‘The phrase “ways of knowing”’,
she says, ‘may sound epistemological, but frequently signals a con-
cern with the broader ontological and metaphysical beliefs of world-
views’ (Ibid., 316). 
There are arguably two ways of framing claims about different
‘ways of knowing’: the first considers these as ‘shorthand for the
larger worldviews of which epistemologies are a part’ (Ibid., 312),
while the second treats claims about different ‘ways of knowing’ as
claims about ‘epistemological diversity’ (Ibid., 313). However, while
this would enable the distinction between epistemology, on the one
hand, and ontology and metaphysics, on the other, the idea of ‘episte-
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mological diversity’ is anything but uncontroversial—as I will
demonstrate later.
A problem with Ruitenberg’s analysis is that her favoured substi-
tutes for ‘ways of knowing’ are every bit as problematic—if not more
so. Thus, she approvingly quotes Michel Foucault’s ‘critique of epis-
temological hegemony’, his analysis of ‘how knowledge and truth are
always part of systems of power’ (Ibid., 315):
Each society has its own regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that
is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the
mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false
statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and
procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those
who are charged with saying what counts as true (Foucault 1984: 73).
At least two concerns arise in this regard. The ideas of ‘regimes of
truth’ and ‘“general politics” of truth’ not only indicate a category
mistake (in treating epistemological matters as necessarily insepara-
ble from matters of social justice), but they also involve relativism
about truth. Is Foucault able to make these sorts of assertions consis-
tently? If he is correct, then this is so only on the basis of his particu-
lar society’s regime or ‘general politics’ of truth—in which case the
question arises why others (i.e., those who do not belong to his par-
ticular society) ought to find his analysis compelling. If he is saying,
however, that this particular truth holds transsocietally, then he has in
effect opened the door to the (strong) possibility of there being other
truths that are not confined to the contexts of society or culture. Either
way, then, this account loses much of its intended force.
The other descriptions offered by Ruitenberg may be less con-
tentious, conceptually, but they cannot work as substitutes for ‘ways
of knowing’. ‘Sources of knowledge’, for example, are different from
‘kinds of knowledge’. The former include observation, sensation, rea-
soning, testimony, memory and the like, while the latter include
 theoretical (or propositional), practical and acquaintance-type knowl-
edge—clearly not the same. What about ‘ways of learning’? ‘Ways of
learning’ may also be, but are not necessarily, ways of acquiring
knowledge. ‘Learning how’ may be said to lead to ‘knowing how’, but
the same is not true for ‘learning that’ and ‘knowing that’. What is
learned may be false, or insufficiently justified. Learning that the
tokoloshe and mantindane ‘are real’ does not imply knowing that they
are. (In addition, assuming the plausibility of Peters’s analysis, ‘learn-
ing’ designates a task, unlike ‘knowledge’—which constitutes an
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achievement; see also Ryle 1963: 28-32). ‘Forms of representation’,
similarly, is hardly a ‘more precise’ phrase than ‘ways of knowing’—
over and above the consideration that ‘representation’ and ‘knowing’
can hardly be treated as synonyms. Apart from these problems of sub-
stitution, Ruitenberg fails to consider the ramifications of referring to,
for example, ‘women’s sources of knowledge’, ‘indigenous ways of
learning’ or ‘African forms of representation’, let alone women’s/
indigenous/ African regimes, or ‘general politics’, of truth.
The response, then, could simply be the following. It appears to be
possible to understand the admittedly awkward phrase ‘ways of know-
ing’ in an extra-epistemological (and extra-ontological), more practi-
cal way—especially given the fact that ‘ways of knowing’ and
‘knowledge (systems)’ are usually treated as conceptually distinct,
mentioned separately.5 ‘Ways of knowing’ would then refer not to
‘systems/ forms of belief’, ‘world views’, ‘ways of being’ and the
like, but to ‘ways of doing’, practices, skills, etc. Either that—or one
might simply refer to ‘African knowledge (systems)’ and, if need be,
distinguish between practical and theoretical knowledge: between
skills or practices, on the one hand, and knowledge proper, on the
other—where the latter also appears to underlie claims about ‘episte-
mological diversity’. If one opts for this interpretation, however, there
are additional problems. Before elaborating on these, however, I wish
to wish to examine a recent account of ‘Afrikaner knowledge’, or
‘knowledge in the blood’, which will enable me to establish a partic-
ular epistemological framework as a viable alternative to Ruitenberg’s.
‘Afrikaner ways of knowing’ or ‘blood knowledge’
‘Knowledge in the blood’ is also the title of Jonathan Jansen’s capti-
vating book.6 The phrase in question is taken from a poem by Mac-
dara Woods. In response to Jansen’s request, the Irish poet explained
‘knowledge in the blood’ as the 
sum total of what we learn (or have to learn—from experience), of love,
disappointment, age, loss, and how this knowledge can both make the
necessary ongoing human reaffirmation of life and hope possible and at
the same time hinder it. … It is almost as though we are carrying psycho-
logical antibodies inside us. The knowledge in the blood, however it got
there, is as ingrained as a disease—although at the same time it can be
truly benign. In this sense the knowledge (which we have been gathering
since childhood, as well as having it handed down from before) can be—
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even at its best—as pitilessly indifferent, as ultimately powerful, and as
random in why it propels us in any particular direction, as a microbe
(Woods; quoted in Jansen 2009: 170-171).
With Jansen, the phrase ‘knowledge in the blood’ receives a rather
specific application. For him, it means 
knowledge embedded in the emotional, psychic, spiritual, social, political,
and psychological lives of a community. Such is the knowledge transmit-
ted faithfully to the second generation of Afrikaner students. It is not,
therefore, knowledge that simply dissipates like the morning mist under
the pressing sunshine of a new regime of truth; if it were, then curriculum
change would be a relatively straightforward matter (Jansen 2009: 171;
emphasis mine).7
‘Knowledge in the blood’, adds Jansen, ‘is habitual’. By this he
means a ‘knowledge that has long been routinised in how the second
generation sees the world and themselves, and how they understand
others’ (Ibid.). It is a 
knowledge that reacts against and resists rival knowledge, for this inher-
ited truth was conceived and delivered in the face of enemies—the Eng-
lish imperialists, the barbarous blacks, the atheistic communists … The
phrase draws attention to deeply rooted knowledge that … is not easily
changed (Ibid., emphasis added).
With regard to curriculum change in particular, Afrikaner ‘respon-
siveness to the new authorities’, to ‘the formal demands of recon-
struction’, should not be construed as a change in ‘deep-rooted
assumptions and beliefs about history, identity, knowledge, and
change: the curriculum is, at base, an institutional subject’. Apart
from seeing it as inscribed in the course syllabus, this also entails
regarding the curriculum as involving 
An understanding of knowledge encoded in the dominant beliefs, values
and behaviors deeply embedded in all aspects in all aspects of institutional
life. Knowledge therefore becomes both what is formally designated for
learning, such as the course syllabus, and what are widely understood
within the institution to be acceptable forms of knowledge and recognised
ways of knowing that distinguish one university type (such as the
Afrikaans universities) from others (Ibid., 171, 172; emphasis added).
Jansen’s project in the book is to attempt to understand the ‘indi-
rect knowledge’ that continues to guide the attitudes and behaviour of
36 Kai Horsthemke
02-Kai:Layout 1  3/30/10  11:58 AM  Page 36
young Afrikaners, with no direct, personal experience of the events of
the (pre-apartheid and apartheid) past. What accounts for white
Afrikaans-speaking people, born around the time of the unbanning of
political organisations like the ANC and Nelson Mandela’s release
from prison, having ‘firm knowledge’ about a past they never experi-
enced, holding ‘rigid views about the present’ (especially with regard
to black people), and conveying ‘fatalistic views about the future’
(Ibid., 51)? Jansen refers to the received, ‘racial knowledge of the
Apartheid state’ (Ibid., 115) also as ‘bitter knowledge’ (Ibid., 114-144
passim). Respectful disruption of this received, ‘indirect’ knowledge
is connected, amongst other things, with the necessity to understand
its power, says Jansen (Ibid., 260-262). This constitutes a key element
of the second part of his project: to understand how a post-conflict
pedagogy contributes to change.8
Compelling as they are, what interests me is not so much Jansen’s
ideas in the latter regard, but rather his use (one might also call it ‘mis-
use’ or at least ‘overuse’) of ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’. He employs the
terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘knowing’ in such a vast and varied number of
ways that one is ultimately unsure what, for Jansen, constitutes knowl-
edge proper and what, if anything, distinguishes it from (mere) belief,
assumption, prejudice, dogma, and the like. On this account, every-
thing is broadcast as ‘knowledge’—only the adjectives and other
descriptors change: this makes for a fairly comprehensive dilution of
the idea in question. Equally disconcertingly, his reference to ‘truth’
appears to involve the assumption that there exist, either consecutively
or concurrently, different regimes of truth, that one people’s truth is not
necessarily (indeed, is frequently not) that of another—which is a rather
hazardous epistemological position to occupy, to say the least. Are the
‘forms of knowledge’ acceptable to, and the ‘ways of knowing’ recog-
nised by, Afrikaners really knowledge and ways of knowing? The same
question can be asked about ‘knowledge in the blood’. The following
analysis will go some way towards accounting for my misgivings about
Jansen’s overly generous bestowal of epistemic (i.e., cognitive) status.
An analysis of ‘knowledge’
When one speaks of ‘knowledge’ in any educationally and/ or socio-
politically relevant way, a distinction is traditionally made (as I have
indicated above) between theoretical and practical knowledge, i.e.,
between ‘knowledge-that’ and ‘knowledge-how’, or ‘knowing-that’
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and ‘knowing-how’.9 Practical knowledge refers to skills and abilities,
whereas theoretical knowledge constitutes the ‘real stuff’ of episte-
mology, concerning not only what I can know but also—and more to
the point here—under what circumstances or conditions I can claim to
know that something is or is not the case. In order to know that some-
thing is the case, the following conditions must be met: I must have an
appropriate (and fairly strong) belief in this regard, my belief must be
true, and it must be adequately justified. ‘Adequate justification’
straddles the subjective and objective conditions of knowledge,
‘belief’ and ‘truth’, respectively. ‘Adequacy’ is determined by three
sets of considerations: the kind of justification it is, its degree, and the
context of justification. Different kinds of justification include obser-
vation, sense experience, introspection, memory, oral and written tes-
timony, and different (deductive and non-deductive) kinds of
reasoning. As far as the requisite degree of justification is concerned,
minimal justification is clearly not enough, while conclusive justifi-
cation is usually not available. Normally (other than in mathematics
and in deductive logic) we accept justification that is less than con-
clusive, i.e., reasons that are nonetheless compelling. 
I have provided a fairly detailed account of the importance of con-
text elsewhere (Horsthemke 2007: 22-25). Considerations of context
bear on the attribution of knowledge insofar as it concerns not only
self- but also (and especially) other-ascription, the framing question
being: ‘Under what circumstances can I/ others be said to know?’
Attribution of knowledge is context-sensitive—which exemplifies
what might be called the ‘social component’ of knowledge. What does
this mean? Apart from being a matter of degree and of kind, ade-
quacy of justification is also determined by application of different
standards, according to age, social and geographic context, access,
availability of information, etc. These standards are applied more
strictly in some cases, more leniently in others. The justification con-
dition therefore permits some kind of leeway. What counts as ade-
quate justification in the case of a young child/ learner or person from
a remote rural area, with limited opportunities, resources or access to
information, will arguably differ from that required of an older, more
mature child/ learner or person from an industrialised, technologi-
cally advanced/ privileged, urban background. With increasing matu-
rity and/or exposure, the standards of knowledge ascription are raised,
the demands regarding adequacy of justification tightened. 
Nonetheless, in all the different cases, the justified belief must be
true. There can be no leniency vis-à-vis the truth requirement. In the
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absence of truth, one cannot meaningfully speak of, or attribute,
knowledge. The important point for educators is that what counts as
suitable justification depends on who is providing the justification
and in what context. One of the responsibilities of an educator is to
appraise learners’ knowledge in a way that is sensitive both to their
level of understanding and to the context of appraisal. A further
(related) responsibility is to develop learners’ grasp of the standards
of adequacy in different learning areas. Again, what is required is not
conclusive justification, or perfect reasons, but compelling reasons.
An important feature of what constitutes compelling reasons is that
they are reliably produced. If reasons are not reliably produced, they
cannot function as justification for one’s belief/s. What does ‘reliably
produced’ mean? For one thing, one’s sense experiences and observa-
tions must be reliably connected to the world; one’s sense organs must
be intact, and so on. For another, one’s reasoning must be of a requi-
site standard—sufficiently critical, rigorous, adequately and appro-
priately informed, and so on.
This analysis of adequate justification indicates why reference to it
must be context-sensitive. Neither our reasoning nor our sense expe-
riences and observations are infallible. Nonetheless, if they are gen-
erally reliable sources of justification, the reasons they produce might
be called ‘compelling’. If reference to compelling reasons is context-
sensitive, this does not mean that the criteria for knowledge-ascription
change with each particular individual, social group, etc., or that
knowledge itself is relative, ambiguous between various concepts,
each based on a different standard. 
The problem of prejudice, and the argument 
from ‘epistemic injustice’
The problem with Jansen’s account of ‘knowledge in the blood’ is that
all kinds of bigotry and prejudice are elevated to the status of ‘knowl-
edge’. Prejudice is manifestly not knowledge, precisely because it
involves judging before the pertinent evidence is in. Yet, ‘prejudg-
ment’ is not necessarily irrational either. Indeed, it may be informed
by a defensible preference and may often have prudential value. Thus,
being vigilant in given circumstances may involve prejudice (insofar
as I prejudge a certain situation), but it has undeniable survival value
in South Africa. More pernicious forms of prejudice are those that
involve injustice and harm.
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‘Epistemic injustice’, argues Miranda Fricker, is a distinct kind of
injustice. She distinguishes between two kinds, ‘testimonial injustice’
and ‘hermeneutical injustice’, each of which consists, ‘most funda-
mentally, in a wrong done to someone specifically in their capacity as
a knower’ (Fricker 2007: 1; see also p. 21). Central to her analysis is
the notion of (social) ‘power’, which Fricker defines as ‘a socially sit-
uated capacity to control others’ actions’ (Ibid., 4). Power works ‘to
create or preserve a given social order’, and is displayed in various
forms of enablement, on the one hand, and disbelief, misinterpreta-
tion and silencing, on the other. It involves the conferral on certain
individuals or groups, qua persons of that kind, ‘a credibility excess’
or ‘a credibility deficit’ (Ibid., 21). Fricker’s interest resides specifi-
cally with ‘identity power’ and the harms it produces through the
manifestation of ‘identity prejudices’. The latter are responsible for
denying credibility to, or withholding it from, certain persons on the
basis of their being members of a certain ‘social type’ (Ibid.). Thus,
testimonial injustice involves rejecting the credibility of their knowl-
edge claims, while hermeneutical injustice involves a general failure
of marshalling the conceptual resources necessary for understanding
and interpreting these knowledge claims. The result is that these peo-
ple are hindered in their self-development and in their attainment of
full human worth: they are ‘prevented from becoming who they are’
(Ibid., 5). In white patriarchal societies, these ‘epistemic humilia-
tions’ (Ibid., 51)10 carry the power to destroy a would-be (black or
female) knower’s confidence to engage in the trustful conversations
(Ibid., 52-53) that characterise well-functioning epistemic communi-
ties. As Fricker suggests, they can ‘inhibit the very formation of self’
(Ibid., 55). Although they are experienced (and may be performed)
individually, testimonial and hermeneutical injustice constitute not
only individual harms: they originate within a social fabric of which
the biases and prejudices that enliven and perpetuate them are a char-
acteristic part. Contesting such injustices and harms, according to
Fricker, requires ‘collective social political change’ (Ibid., 8). 
Given how prejudice affects various levels of credibility, and given
that the rejection of ‘African ways of knowing’ has sometimes been
part of a hegemonic discourse and constituted epistemic injustice, the
question might now be raised whether my critique of this notion (and
its affiliates, like ‘indigenous knowledge’) is not part of this dis-
course. I do not believe it is. If ‘credibility deficit’ is a matter of
 epistemic injustice, then why should ‘credibility excess’ (giving pre-
viously ‘epistemologically humiliated’ people or groups lots of
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 credibility) not also constitute epistemic harm? More fundamentally,
surely there is a difference between criticising someone’s view on the
mere grounds that she is black, or a woman, and criticising the views
held or expressed by someone, who happens to be black or a woman,
on the grounds of faulty or fallacious reasoning. Nonsense is not cul-
turally, racially or sexually specific. Indeed, although she gestures in
the direction of a basic ‘do no harm’ principle (Ibid., 85), Fricker her-
self insists that a ‘“vulgar” relativist’ resistance to passing moral judg-
ment on other cultures ‘is incoherent’ (Ibid., 106).
The problem of relativism
The problem of relativism appears to pertain both to African and
Afrikaner knowledge. If knowledge and truth did differ from individ-
ual to individual, society to society, culture to culture (assuming that
assertions to this effect would not present insurmountable consistency
problems for the advocacy of African and Afrikaner knowledge and
truth—this relates to Fricker’s reference to ‘incoherence’), then it
would be presumptuous to pass judgment on another’s knowledge
claim. Thus, it would be very difficult to judge (positively or nega-
tively) the ‘God-sponsored’ segregationist views of staunchly Calvin-
ist-Christian Afrikaners,11 or Mutwa’s assertions about the tokoloshe
and mantindane, or to determine the veracity of beliefs in ancestral
reward and retribution.12 Moreover, in order to decide what is true or
false, one would merely have to consult the beliefs prevalent in one’s
own society (we might recall the beliefs of white Afrikaner suprema-
cists in this regard). Finally, one could not really say whether any
progress has been taking place in a society, in terms of advancement
in knowledge. Thus, one would be committed to the position that evo-
lutionary theory cannot be held to have contributed to scientific and
epistemic progress, vis-à-vis religious doctrines like creationism or
intelligent-design, or that the heliocentric view of the universe does
not constitute a substantial improvement on the geocentric view.
(Similar considerations would pertain to normative talk about reform
and transformation—for example, educational and socio-political
transformation, in Africa as elsewhere.)
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The problem of superstition
The second problem is that of superstition. Of course, it might be
argued now (see, for example, Asante 2005: 41) that the term ‘super-
stition’ has been and continues to be widely abused as a hegemonic
tool, that is, in order to discredit any view or opinion that is unortho-
dox or that fails to conform to the standards or paradigms of occi-
dental rationality.13 Granted, some manifestations of the latter are
highly dubious. After all, the evils of ‘Western’ expansionism—colo-
nialism, racism (both manifest in apartheid legislation), the massive
subjugation and exploitation of entire cultures, nonhuman animals
and the natural environment14—deserve to be condemned in the
strongest possible terms. This requires an approach that is capable of
pinpointing and unravelling the inconsistencies and, indeed, irrational
attitudes in question. Bearing in mind these concerns, I will—in what
follows—use the term ‘superstition’ to refer to ‘more or less widely
held but unjustified/ insufficiently justified and false idea or belief’. 
The problem with ‘African ways of knowing’, understood in terms
of claims about epistemological diversity, is that anything that is hon-
estly and (more or less) justifiably believed and advanced as a knowl-
edge claim could count as knowledge proper. There would be no way
to distinguish between knowledge and superstition. Acceptance of the
idea of African ways of knowing would render difficult, if not impos-
sible, a distinction between knowledge and superstition, or other
kinds of irrational belief. Apart from the previously cited account of
the tokoloshe and mantindane, other examples of superstition include
the misconceptions that underlie the refusal of many South African
men to undergo a vasectomy (which is seen to threaten or undermine
their masculinity and virility)—as well as the belief/s that HIV/ AIDS
is caused by witches and can be prevented or cured through sexual
intercourse with a virgin. Similar considerations also pertain to
‘knowledge in the blood’. According to a widespread belief, ‘the
Afrikaner was planted by God at the southern tip of Africa to spread
the light of the gospel and civilisation on a dark continent; the
Afrikaner is exclusively a white race and those who are not of pure
white blood are excluded’ (Jansen 2009: 292n.24; see also p. 158). 
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The esprit sorcier and the African Renaissance
The most conspicuous examples of superstition are found in witch-
craft beliefs15 and witchcraft accusations. President of the Zimbabwe
National Traditional Healers Association Gordon Chavunduka sees
the July 2006 amendment to Zimbabwe’s Witchcraft Suppression Act,
which in effect legalises accusations of witchcraft,16 as a ‘step in the
right direction towards asserting our culture that has been trampled
upon by successive colonial governments’ (quoted in Kumar 2006:
26). The amendment, then, is seen as an endorsement of ‘African (or
traditional) knowledge’, worldviews, practices and values. It also
implies a distinction between traditional ways of knowing that are
good or beneficial (such as traditional healers’ medicinal and herbal
knowledge, divination practices, etc.) and those that are bad or harm-
ful (witchcraft and other occult practices, like the use of human body
parts; see Becker passim). 
Bartholomäus Grill quotes Valentin Yves Mudimbe as calling the
esprit sorcier, belief in witchcraft, one of the greatest obstructions to
development (Grill 2005: 1). Witchcraft belief, says Grill, pertains to
all African peoples, cultures, and strata and levels of society. Witchcraft
belief, according to Grill, becomes an instrument of social control, of
terror, that strengthens power and property relations, that prevents
upward social mobility and punishes the industrious, mentally immo-
bilises people and thus obstructs the development of modern homo
oeconomicus (Ibid., 3). Not only outsiders, strangers and individualists
are accused of witchcraft but also those who are successful and good-
looking, who happen to be adversaries—be it in sport, romance or
business (and conversely, of course, those who happen to be economi-
cally unsuccessful, and who are consequently blamed for the commu-
nity’s misfortune or lack of success; see Becker 2007b: 164).
In general opposition to indigenous knowledge apologists,
Anthony Holiday argues that African beliefs and practices, taking for
granted traditional customs (lobola, or ‘bride wealth’, initiation rites,
and the like), ‘undemocratic traditional authority and African systems
of jurisprudence’, treating ‘the pronouncements of sangomas [as] a
kind of holy writ’, etc. are all ‘inimical to the scientific spirit’. He
claims that it is a matter of ‘choice between two antagonistic forms of
life. One must die if the other is to flourish’ (Holiday 2006: 11). 
Elsewhere, Grill seems to postulate a ‘third alternative’, the possi-
bility of which Holiday denies. Describing an incident involving tra-
ditional healing, Grill contends:
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It is beyond our rational world, yet the result achieved validates the old
medical adage, ‘He who heals is right’. … The traditional healer has, in a
way, also healed me – or rather, he has cured me of the occidental obses-
sion with knowledge, the need to penetrate and dissect everything intel-
lectually. In Africa, one learns to live with question marks. One
understands what one cannot understand—and over the years one
becomes more circumspect and cautious, perhaps even more lenient in
one’s judgments about the continent (Grill 2003: 12).
Apart from holding despotic and corrupt governments in Africa
responsible for the suffering of ordinary people, Chandra Kumar also
blames ‘Eurocentric rationalism’, the ‘Men of … Economic Reason’,
and Western rationality for its contribution to witch hysteria, by pro-
moting economic conditions that favour the West (Kumar 2006: 26).
The worse off people are, the more prone they are to beliefs in the
occult, the paranormal, ‘diabolical forces’ responsible for their mis-
ery. Kumar quotes Chavunduka, who acknowledges the conditions
that underlie witch hysteria: for him, ‘the cause is economic’ and ‘the
worse the economy gets, the more political tension there is in society,
the more frustrated and frightened people get’ (Ibid.). True: globali-
sation may well be colonialism’s modern heir. Yet, Kumar’s equation
is as problematic as the one he confronts, namely that it is supersti-
tion/ African ‘unreason’ that is the major (if not the sole) cause of
Africa’s misery, and that it is attributable to lack of education or of
‘basic scientific literacy’ (Richard Petraitis, quoted in Kumar 2006;
see also Holiday 2006: 11). It is problematic because Kumar falls
into the trap of implicitly portraying ordinary Africans as victims and
recipients, to whom considerations of agency and responsibility do
not apply. Moreover, like Grill, he fails to distinguish sufficiently
between ‘witchcraft beliefs’ and ‘witchcraft accusations’. I will
address these two problems in turn.
Axelle Kabou, in her much-maligned pamphlet ‘Et si l’Afrique
refusait le développement?’ (‘And if Africa refused development?’;
Kabou 1991), blames not only power-crazy heads of state and the
corrupt elites for the plight of the continent, but also ordinary people,
each and every individual. According to Kabou, Africans still believe
that the world owes them salvation of the continent, as belated com-
pensation for past injustices, their victim- and beggar mentality
being strengthened by the sentimental humanitarianism of naïve
white aid workers. Africans should look in the mirror, in order to
realise their own part in this misery. Yet, writes Kabou, they refuse to
do this. It is invariably the others who are to blame, foreign compa-
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nies, the unjust global system of trade, the World Bank, the debt and
poverty trap—not to mention the inherited burdens of colonialism.
The black elites and the white helpers are united in their dogma that
there exists a century-old plot by the white man against the black
man, while they refuse to contemplate the more complex causes of
this perpetual crisis. 
Many consider Kabou’s claim, that ‘Africa-this-wonderful-conti-
nent-that-was-in-perfect-harmony-before-the-invasion-of-the-
colonisers’ is an anti-colonialist myth and has nothing to do with
reality, downright blasphemous. Certainly, her pamphlet is not with-
out stereotyping, of ‘the Africans’ as such. She tends to neglect the
external factors of this chronic crisis, like the deprivation syndrome
that white rule has left behind in the collective psyche. She also for-
gets that Africa lacks the springboard for the huge leap from agrarian
society to industrial society. Modernisation was forced onto a conti-
nent that was unable to support it, socio-structurally and culturally,
while the existing entrepreneurship and infrastructure were systemat-
ically undermined and destroyed by the colonial masters (Grill 2003:
115). There is no room for such historical subtleties in Kabou’s gen-
eral account. Nonetheless, no serious debate about the problems fac-
ing Africa can afford to ignore her fundamental thesis. She refers not
only to the failed modernisation of postcolonial Africa but to mod-
ernisation that was refused, Africans being the only people on earth
who still think that others must take care of their development. Kabou
does not simply intend to condemn her African contemporaries. She
wants to rouse them into shaking off their ‘unbearable mediocrity’.
Indeed, the demand for self-criticism makes her argument com-
pelling. Unlike (for example) Kumar’s, it takes ordinary Africans seri-
ously, as agents in their own right, rather than portraying them as
will- and helpless victims or puppets at the mercy of the powers-that-
be (corrupt leaders the wealthy black elites, foreign companies, the
World Bank, etc.) and as suffering under the unjust global system of
trade, the debt and poverty trap—not to mention the inherited burdens
of colonialism.
Stephen Ellis and Gerrie Ter Haar are in agreement with Kumar’s
contention that legislation like the amendment to the Witchcraft Sup-
pression Act in Zimbabwe enables the suffering masses to blame
‘their troubles on diabolical forces rather than on the government and
business interests that profit from their misery’ (Kumar 2006: 26):
‘Popular beliefs in witchcraft have become a convenient cover for
cynical political manipulations’ (Ellis and Ter Haar 2004: 150). Yet,
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their analysis of the pertinent conflicts is a little subtler than Kumar’s.
For one thing, they draw an analytical distinction between 
witchcraft beliefs—the content of which, as with other forms of spiritual
belief, cannot be empirically tested—and witchcraft accusations that may
follow from such belief. Witchcraft accusations, unlike witchcraft
beliefs, can be empirically observed, and the ensuing actions analysed
(Ibid., 149).
According to Ellis and Ter Haar, ‘discussions in Africa on how to
deal with witchcraft accusations often take on a culturalist tone that
some people feel to be appropriate in a postcolonial age’ (Ibid., 153).
The common view is that witchcraft beliefs are authentically African
and that witchcraft ‘really’ exists in Africa. As a consequence, gov-
ernments in postcolonial Africa should be free to devise mecha-
nisms—both in terms of legislation and policing—for dealing with
these phenomena. ‘In South Africa, only recently freed from the rule
of a white minority, this approach is sometimes said to be in keeping
with the idea of African Renaissance, launched by the government as
a project for the regeneration of the continent’ (Ibid.). In this regard,
Ellis and Ter Haar worry about the proliferation of all kinds of ‘illib-
eral attitudes’ and beliefs that are claimed to be ‘authentically African
and therefore justifiable in the new age’ (Ibid.). So much the worse for
liberal attitudes, someone like Kumar would probably respond. It is
clear, however, that governments need to take witchcraft fears and
their implications and consequences seriously. Neither amendments
to existing legislation like in Zimbabwe nor the verdict that these
fears should be ignored appear to be an appropriate response to the
cause of such considerable personal and social misery.
What to do, then? Ellis and Ter Haar suggest that the 
most desirable course might be for the state to retain the principle of reli-
gious freedom, including the freedom of people to believe in witchcraft as
in other religious construct. This demonstrates in concrete terms the
importance of making an analytical distinction between witchcraft belief
and witchcraft accusations … The state would be well advised, thus, to
observe debates on witchcraft beliefs with a view to intervening when
there seems to be a real risk of a criminal action such as physical assault
(Ellis and Ter Haar 2004: 153-154; see also Becker 2007b: 165, 166). 
Ellis and Ter Haar’s appears to be at best a short-term solution—it
is a response only to the symptoms of the problem, one that fails to
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get to its roots. I submit that, in the longer term, nothing short of a
radical commitment to the alleviation of poverty and to education for
global citizenship (for example, the teaching of critical thinking
skills) will do. If anything, reference to ‘African ways of knowing’,
moves like the July 2006 amendment to Zimbabwe’s Witchcraft Sup-
pression Act, etc. are more likely to contribute to the ongoing under-
development of Africa and to its increasing marginalisation.
Concluding remarks: The exigencies of ‘truth’
When Didier Kaphagawani explains that, in his home language
Chewa, ‘(w)hat is true is what is seen … or perceived by either an
individual or a collection of individuals’ (Kaphagawani 1998: 241),
he clearly confuses truth and justification. Observation and percep-
tion are sources of justification and knowledge. Given the possibility
of observational error and perceptual relativity, they are not identical
with truth as such. Even consensus among all individuals about what
they perceive does not amount to truth, the way things really are.
The challenge for anyone who disagrees with the present analysis
would be to furnish an understanding of knowledge, knowing and truth
that is both coherent and consistent. ‘The truth’ may be the world’s
secret—but we can learn to avoid falsehoods and error and, in so
doing, get closer to the way things really are—or were, for that matter. 
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Notes
1. Mutwa, according to the publicity information on the back cover, is a ‘well-
known wise man of Africa and sanusi (uppermost sangoma) of all sangomas [tra-
ditional healers] in southern Africa, [and] respected and well-known by people
across the world’.
2. Dei (Dei 2004: 339) employs the following account:
Indigenous knowledge is knowledge arising with the long-term occupancy of
place. … It is knowledge unique to a given culture or society characterized by
the common sense ideas, thoughts, values of people formed as a result of the
sustained interactions of society, nature and culture[,]
before quoting Roberts’s definition of indigenous knowledge as knowledge
‘“accumulated by a group of people, not necessarily indigenous, who, by cen-
turies of unbroken residence, develop an in-depth understanding  of their partic-
ular place in their particular world”’ (ibid.; Roberts 1998: 59).
3. Given that Dei is referring here to traditional African forms of knowledge, I am
unsure to what extent they could contribute towards transformation—i.e., as
opposed to ‘retroformation’.
4. Ruitenberg uses the words ‘hides’ and, elsewhere, ‘masks’. I am not sure whether
these apply to the accounts of ‘African ways of knowing’ provided by Asante,
Dei and others. I suspect not—hence my preference for the broader (and perhaps
more equivocal) term ‘covers’.
5. Dei, for example, speaks of a transformation of education and schooling that
includes ‘diverse forms of knowledge and ways of knowing’ (Dei 2004: 339).
6. Formerly (notably at the time of writing the book) dean of the University of Pre-
toria’s Faculty of Education, Jansen is currently the vice-chancellor of the Uni-
versity of the Free State.
7. It is worth noting the Foucauldean phrase here. I must confess to never ceasing
to be amazed at how this kind of confused relativism continues to hold eminent
thinkers in thrall. 
8. On parallels between Jansen’s experiences and his own as rector at the Univer-
sity of the Western Cape, see also Jakes Gerwel (Gerwel 2009).
9. A third sense is constituted by ‘knowledge’ and ‘knowing’ in the acquaintance or
familiarity sense, as in ‘knowledge of a place’, ‘knowing a person’ etc.—which,
however, I take to be less pertinent here.
10. Fricker borrows the notion of epistemic humiliation from Simone de Beauvoir.
11. Jansen refers, in this regard, to ‘divine knowledge’ (see Jansen 2009: 157-162).
See also Jansen 2009: 158, 292n.24.
12. For example, Dei writes that ‘the living are emboldened by ancestral knowledge
and the wisdom of the dead’, and that
ancestral spirits are living knowledges. They are acknowledged as guardians
of the living. They provide knowledge, wisdom and advice and regulate living
practice. (Dei 2004: 356; see also Dei 2002: 6)
13. The Latin term ‘superstitio’, referring to a concept that first surfaced in the 15th
century, was used initially to denigrate as ‘false belief’ any view or opinion that
diverged from official Christian doctrine and orthodoxy.
14. The most significant current example of complacency and arrogance on the part
of some of the economic superpowers must be their refusal to take seriously the
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impending environmental and energy crises or to initiate and abide by substan-
tial measures to curb global warming.
15. Take, for example, the cases of ‘muti murder’ and the use of human body parts
that Becker has reported on and analysed in considerable detail. There are at least
three distinct kinds of superstition that pervade these practices (and these are
beliefs that are held not only by the practitioners but by the majority of the pop-
ulation of sub-Sahara Africa; see Becker 2007b: 165): 1) that this kind of muti
(or ‘medicine’) works; 2) that the vocalization of the victim—which expresses
his/ her ‘life essence’—enhances the power of the ‘medicine’ that is ideally taken
from the (still) living person; and 3) that the discovery of the body (after the req-
uisite parts, bones or organs have been removed, and the victim has—as is com-
mon—been left to bleed to death) secures additional effectiveness (Becker
2007b: 159).  
16. Given pertinent ‘evidence’, the amendment permits the state to convict and pun-
ish a person when it considers her witchcraft harmful (see Kumar 2006: 26). The
South African Witchcraft Suppression (No. 3 of 1957, last amended in 1997)
only mentions ‘the practice of witchcraft and similar practices’. It also fails to
make a sufficiently clear distinction between using ‘witchcraft’ or ‘supernatural
means’ and pretending or professing to do so.
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